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Comment
COMMERCIAL NOTES AND DEFINITION OF 'SECURITY'
UNDER SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934: A NOTE IS A NOTE
IS A NOTE?
EDITOR'S NOTE-After this comment was set in type,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Lino v. City Investing Co., [1973 Current] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,124 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1973), reversed the
district court's holding, criticized in this article, that the
promissory notes involved were securities. The primary
basis for the Third Circuit's decision was that the com-
mercial context of the transaction in which the notes were
given required a holding that the notes were not securities.
In this regard, and in several finer details of the opinion,
the views of the Third Circuit coincide with those of the
author expressed in this comment. There remains, how-
ever, a split among the federal courts on the issue, which
perhaps indicates its ripeness for definitive Supreme Court
review.
I. INTRODUCTION
The relative ease with which one may recover for a violation of
SEC Rule lOb-51 has led prospective plaintiffs to seek redress in
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rule lOb-5], pro-
mulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter
cited as the 1934 Act], § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud,
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federal forums2 even though their claims do not involve instru-
ments which fall within the everyday conception of securities.
Since 1970 five cases3 have posed to the federal courts an issue
never before examined in the context presented: Whether the
maker of a promissory note given in an ordinary commercial con-
text for a purpose other than the general financing of its business
may sue in the federal courts for alleged fraud on the part of the
payee. Stated differently, the question is whether the taking of
such a note by the payee constitutes the "purchase"4 of a "secu-
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud upon any per-
son,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
"It is now established that a private right of action is implied
under § 10(b)." Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The truth of this statement was virtually
unquestioned even before that Supreme Court pronouncement.
See 6 L. Loss, SEcturxias REGULATION 3869-73 (2d ed. 1961, Supp.
1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; 1 A. BRONMERG, SEcumrriss LAw:
FRAuD-SEC Rurx 10b-5 § 2.4(1) (1967), as supplemented [herein-
after cited as BRONMERG]. Furthermore, Rule 10b-5 is the broadest
of the remedial fraud provisions in the federal securities law arsenal.
1 .BRONMERG § 2.3 (800). It is generally easier to recover for securities
fraud under the Rule than under state law. See 1 BROMBERG § 2.7(1)-(2); Part IIIAI. infra.
2. The 1934 Act, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), confers upon the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising from the Act. If the
disputes described in this article are cognizable in the federal
courts, they would fall solely within the province of the 1934
Act with its exclusive federal jurisdiction. See note 4 infra.
3. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973);
Lino v. City Investing Co., Civil No. 1439-71 (D.N.J. April 25, 1972),
appeal docketed, Nos. 72-1672, 72-1673, 3d Cir., Aug. 7, 1972; MacAn-
drews & Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1401
(D.S.C. 1972); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp.
307 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F.
Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). All
five cases presented claims for relief under Rule lOb-5; the plain-
tiffs in Lino, MacAndrews and Joseph also asserted additional
grounds for relief.
4. The question must be phrased in terms of a fraudulent "purchase"
rather than in terms of a fraudulent "sale" for both conceptual and
statutory reasons. Conceptually, the word "purchase" rather than
"sale" is necessary because it is the maker of the note who is as-
serting that he, as the "seller" of a "security," was defrauded by the
payee, as the "purchaser" of a "security." But the distinction is
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rity'"5 within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6
If the answer to these questions is affirmative, then, as stated
in Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.7 by the first federal court to
more than conceptually significant in view of the statutory scheme
of the federal securities laws. The Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter
cited as the 1933 Act], 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970), prohibits only
fraud on the part of sellers. Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1970), imposes civil liability on certain persons involved in
the preparation of a registration statement; such persons are neces-
sarily on the "seller's side" of the picture. Similarly, sections 12(2)
and 17 (a) of the 1933 Act are limited to fraud on the part of offerors
or sellers of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970) ("Any person who
... offers or sells a security"); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970) ("any per-
son in the offer or sale of any security"). In contrast, the 1934 Act,
§ 10(b) and Rule lob-5 promulgated thereunder, prohibit fraud on
the part of both purchasers and sellers of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(b) (1970) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) (both prohibiting fraud
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"). See gen-
erally 1 BRONVBERG §§ 2.1, 2.3(100), 2.3(800). Thus, the situations
discussed in this article, being limited to suits by makers against
payees, would fall exclusively under the 1934 Act.
The 1934 Act, § 3(a) (13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13) (1970), defines
the word "purchase" as "includ[ing] any contract to buy, purchase,
or otherwise acquire." It should be noted that all of the definitions
in § 3 (a) are limited by the phrase "unless the context otherwise
requires."
5. The 1934 Act, § 3 (a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (10) (1970) states:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury
stock bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instru-
ment commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include any cur-
rency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's ac-
ceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of
not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or
any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise lim-
ited. (Emphasis added.)
It constantly must be remembered that this definition is likewise
limited by the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires."
Although this definition of a "security" is slightly different from
that found in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), both
the Senate Report and the Supreme Court have recognized that the
two definitions are functional equivalents. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1934) ("substantially the same"); Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967) ("virtually identical"). See generally
2 Loss 795-96; 5 id. 2729.
6. See supra notes 4 and 5.
7. 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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be faced with the issue in the context of the maker suing the
payee," federal
jurisdiction could be invoked with respect to any claim of fraud in
connection with the issuance of a check or note, no matter how
small the transaction (e.g., the purchase of an automobile or re-
frigerator), provided the mails or some other instrumentality of
interstate commerce were used.... [T]he maker of the note or
check as well as the payee would be entitled to sue.9
And although the Movielab court did "not view this as the type of
situation that prompted the enactment of the federal securities
laws,"1 0 it did in fact answer the questions affirmatively. Since
that case, two other federal courts have agreed" and two have
disagreed1 2 with that answer.
The number of everyday transactions in which promissory notes
are given makes the resolution of this conflict significant for not
only the securities specialist, but indeed for all lawyers. If the
three decisions answering the questions affirmatively are correct,
then the unwary may well find that any dispute concerning a
promissory note given to him presents a federal case and a shift
in the applicable law from the state laws of sales, warranties and
negotiable instruments to the federal securities acts. The premise
of this article is that the question should be answered in the nega-
tive: The payee of an "ordinary commercial note" given for a pur-
pose other than the general financing of the maker's business is
not a "purchaser" of a "security" within the meaning of the 1934
8. In the prior case of City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp.
592 (W.D. Ark. 1968), aifd, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970), the makers of notes counterclaimed against the
suing payee-bank, but not on the theory that the payee had fraudu-
lently purchased the notes. Rather the theory aired in both the
lower and appellate courts was that the payee, through one of its
officers and agents, had participated in a fraudulent sale of stock in
a corporation owned by the agent and others. The proceeds of the
notes were used by the makers to purchase the stock of a corpora-
tion formed by them. The maker's corporation then bought all of
the stock in the agent's corporation. The courts held that the payee
was not a seller of the stock in the agent's corporation. This case
is discussed more fully in note 80 infra.
9. 321 F. Supp. at 808.
10. Id.
11. Lino v. City Investing Co., Civil No. 1439-71 (D.N.J. April 25, 1972);
MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F. Supp.
1401 (D.S.C. 1972).
12. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973);
Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo.
1971).
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Act.13 He should, therefore, not be subject to the maker's suit in
the federal courts absent some other jurisdictional basis.
Part II of this article will analyze the few cases posing the spe-
cific issue in the light of the statute itself, its legislative history,
and the relevant case law. Part III will explore the many rami-
fications of an affirmative answer to the questions. Part IV will
suggest various criteria to aid in the determination of whether a
particular instrument is an "ordinary commercial note," falling
outside the ambit of the 1934 Act, or an "investment note," falling
within the federal law. The discussion will be limited primarily
to situations involving suits by the makers of notes against their
payees.
II. THE CASES PRO AND CON
A. THE CASES PRO
The three cases answering affirmatively the issues posed fol-
lowed similar lines of reasoning. In Movielab the maker of the
notes in question purchased from the payee certain film process-
ing and optical businesses. Three promissory notes were given for
the businesses. Two were eight per cent installment notes for
5,250,000 dollars each, payable over twenty years, and the other
was a shorter term note for 4,178,312 dollars. The maker sued the
payee in federal district court, alleging fraud under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. The fraud was based on alleged
false representations and concealment of certain material facts.
The maker sought damages and rescission.
The federal court rejected the payee's claim that the notes were
not "securities," but instead constituted a mere individual loan of
the type not encompassed within the 1934 Act. The court admitted
that the purpose of the federal antifraud provisions was to protect
13. See supra notes 4 and 5. "Ordinary commercial note" as used in
this article describes a note with those characteristics analyzed in
Part IV infra which cause it to be one which should not be treated
as a "security" under the 1934 Act. The phrase "ordinary commer-
cial note" does not comprehend short term commercial paper which
literally falls within the express exception to the definition of a
"security." See supra note 5. Such short term paper raises totally
different issues beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts,
39 U. Cnr. L. REv. 362 (1972).
In contrast, "investment note" will be used in this article to
describe a note possessing those characteristics which cause it to
be one which should be treated as a "security" under the 1934 Act.
Whenever it is said in this article that a note "is not a security," it
is meant that the note is not an "investment note."
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investors and that "if instruments used in every private loan trans-
action qualified as securities under the federal statutes,"'14 then
federal jurisdiction could be invoked with respect to any claim of
fraud involving checks and notes no matter how small the trans-
action. The court even expressed its belief that such situations
were not of the type that prompted the passage of the federal se-
curities laws. But the court then read the definition of "security"
in the 1934 Act and found "in unequivocal and all-embracive lan-
guage, that 'The term "security" means any note! "15 The court
reasoned that "this plain language, literally read, clearly includes
promissory notes of the type that are the subject of the present
suit."16
The Movielab court cited various 1940-vintage Supreme Court
decisions to support its plain meaning-literal language approach
to statutory interpretation. It attempted to bolster its reasoning
by noting that other courts had reached the same result, "holding
that the issuance of a promissory note as part of a private commer-
cial transaction constitutes the 'sale' of a security within the mean-
ing of the anti-fraud provisions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.' 7
But the essence of the court's opinion appeared in the following
language:
14. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 808 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 809. The court cited various lower federal court decisions
supporting this view, including the leading case of Llanos v. United
States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954).
Llanos involved a criminal prosecution for fraud under the 1933 Act
and for mail fraud. The court of appeals affirmed the defendants'
convictions for fraudulently offering and selling promissory notes on
the basis of false representations. The Movielab court failed to rec-
ognize at least two distinctions between the situation it faced and that
presented in Llanos. First, Llanos in fact did not involve what the
Movielab court itself characterized as "a private commercial transac-
tion" for the sale of assets, such as the one before it. Movielab, Inc.
v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). On the
contrary, Llanos involved the sale of notes to many individuals, per-
haps even a public offering of such instruments, to finance a criminal
enterprise. Second, Llanos was a criminal prosecution against a
maker of notes and did not involve a civil suit by a maker against
a payee.
The Movielab court also relied upon the often-cited case of
Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th
Cir. 1969). The Lehigh court's unfortunate statement, quoted in
Movieab, that the "definition of a security has been literally read
by the judiciary to the extent that almost all notes are held to be
securities," id. at 991-92, will be discussed more fully later.
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Try as we may, we fail to detect in the 1934 Act any grant of
discretionary power to the court to construe the term "security"
as including certain types of notes but not others. Congress ap-
parently decided that it would pass a sweeping prohibition rather
than attempt to draw such distinctions. We are bound by that
decision. 18
As will become apparent in further discussions of the Mov-
ielab case in this article, this writer believes that the result in the
case may have been proper,19 but that the reasoning employed by
the district court to reach its result was highly erroneous. The
court's belief that small check and note transactions did not prompt
the enactment of the federal securities laws was no doubt well-
founded, but if the court meant to imply that the factual situa-
tion before it was also of the type not intended to be covered by the
federal acts, then that implication is questionable. Thus, the crit-
icisms leveled at the Movielab case are not directed at its result
but rather at its reasoning. For this reason, the case will be
analyzed in Part IIB in terms of its reasoning only. The result in
Movielab will be discussed in other parts of this article.20
The federal district court in MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. Amer-
ican Barmag Corp.2 1 reached the same result as Movielab in an-
other suit by a maker of notes22 against their payees. The notes
were given to the payees in exchange for machinery. The maker,
alleging various misrepresentations concerning the capabilities of
the machines it purchased, based its right to recovery on Rule
10b-5. 23
The court, citing Movielab, repeated the statement that "the
definition of security ... is unequivocal and all-embracing." 24 The
18. 321 F. Supp. at 809. The district court's decision in Movielab was
affirmed per curiam by the Second Circuit. 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.
1971). For a discussion of the nebulous grounds of the affirm-
ance, see Parts IVD-E, infra.
19. See Parts IIC, IVD-E and V infra.
20. See supra note 19.
21. 339 F. Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972).
22. The instruments in question in MacAndrews were actually bills of
exchange, but as the court stated, "A bill of exchange, of course, is
merely a form of a note." Id. at 1406.
23. The maker also alleged violations of the 1933 Act. The court sus-
tained the maker's right to relief under that Act as well as under
the 1934 Act, provided the allegations were true. Id. at 1407. The
court thus totally ignored the distinction between a fraudulent "pur-
chase," allegedly involved in the case, and a fraudulent "sale," not
at all presented by the facts. See supra note 4. The maker's com-
plaint also set forth a count based on breaches of express and implied
warranties.
24. 339 F. Supp. at 1406.
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court continued by noting that Congress did not intend a strict con-
struction of the word "security." Also, the Supreme Court had
indicated that the words used in the definition of "security" were
generic terms which should be given very broad meanings.25 In
conclusion, the court found that the notes were "securities" and
their issuance was a "sale."
The third case answering the questions posed in the affirma-
tive was Lino v. City Investing Co. 26 In Lino the maker of six
promissory notes totalling 50,000 dollars sued the payee's parent
corporation,27 alleging a misstatement of material facts. The notes
were given to the payee for two franchise agreements. The dis-
trict court accepted the maker's assertion that the notes were se-
curities and that the allegations, if true, constituted a fraudulent
purchase on the part of the payee. The court, recognizing its
holding to be "an extreme result" which meant "that any maker
of a promissory note who is fraudulently induced to purchase an
object could avail himself of a federal forum to redress the wrong,"
concluded that the "clear language" of the statutes compelled that
result.28
B. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONING OF THE CASES PRO
The reasoning of each of the three courts which gave affirma-
tive answers to the questions posed reveals the same flaws. This
reasoning will be examined in the light of the statute itself, its
legislative history, and the relevant case law.
1. The Statute Itself
Not one of the three courts recognized the cardinal rule em-
bodied in the statute itself that the definitions given are to be ap-
plied only if the context does not otherwise require. 29  It seems
strange that the Lino court, apparently reluctant to reach its "ex-
treme result," and the Movielab court, which seemed to believe
that the situation before it was not of the type that prompted the
25. See note 51, second paragraph, infra.
26. Civil No. 1439-71 (D.N.J. April 25, 1972).
27. For a discussion of the liabilities of a "controlling person," see Part
IIIA2 infra.
28. Civil No. 1439-71 at R. 180a-89a. The district court's decision in
Lino was certified for interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). The case is presently pend-
ing. Id., appeal docketed, Nos. 72-1672, 72-1673, 3d Cir., Aug. 7, 1972.
29. The 1934 Act, § 3 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970) sets forth the defini-
tions to be "used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise re-
quires." (Emphasis added.)
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passage of the Act, failed to explore-or even mention-this prin-
ciple. Surely Congress, by explicitly requiring the context-over-
text method of construction, intended that this requirement be as
"unequivocal and all-embracing" as the language used in the defi-
nitions themselves. Certainly this method of statutory construc-
tion is more difficult than the plain meaning-literal language ap-
proach, but the context-over-text method is compelled by the need
for flexibility "to meet the countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others. °3 0 Thus, the
question is one of statutory interpretation by an analysis required
by the statute itself. The court in Movielab confused this inter-
pretive analysis with discretion "to construe the term 'security'
as including certain types of notes but not others."'' 3 Indeed, un-
less the "context" language of the statute is to be rendered mean-
ingless, it is manifest that Congress did in fact mean to say that
some notes are securities while others properly may not be so
treated. The position taken by this article, that ordinary commer-
cial notes are not securities, essentially is based on the premise that
the context does require non-security treatment for such notes.
The three courts also avoided the statement in the 1934 Act
of the reasons for its passage. The statute recites the necessity to
control
transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets . . . transactions by of-
ficers, directors, and principal securities holders .... transactions
. . . carried on in large volume by the public generally... [and]
manipulation and control [of securities prices, which] gives rise to
excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluc-
tuations in the prices of securities.3 2
This language does not connote a need to regulate ordinary com-
mercial notes arising from private loan transactions.
2. Legislative History
Not only did the Movielab, MacAndrews and Lino courts disre-
gard the context-over-text approach compelled by the statute and
the recited reasons for the passage of the 1934 Act, but they also
ignored the import of the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934
Acts.38  Although there is no history on whether ordinary com-
30. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
31. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 809 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
32. The 1934 Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
33. The Movielab court paid lip service to legislative intent:
The primary purpose behind the adoption of the antifraud
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mercial notes are to be included in the definition of a "security,"
the history of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts reveals a preoccupation
with investment instruments.
President Roosevelt's messages to Congress on both Acts indi-
cate his concern with investments.3 4 Similarly, the concept of reg-
ulating investments permeates the Congressional reports on both
Acts. The Senate Report accompanying the 1933 Act states:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and
honest business. The basic policy is that of informing the investor
of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate
and foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and
misrepresentation.85
The House report on the 1933 Act states that the definition of "se-
curity" is "in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include
within that definition the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."3 6
The legislative history behind the 1934 Act also indicates an in-
tent to control investment instruments without any concern over
what this article describes as "ordinary commercial notes." Spe-
cifically referring to section 10(b), the Senate Report states that
"Subsection (b) authorizes the Commission by rules and regula-
tions to prohibit or regulate the use of any other manipulative or
deceptive practices which it finds detrimental to the interests of the
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts was to protect public
investors against fraud in the sale of securities of the type
normally offered in the market place.
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 809 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). But, as has been seen, the court proceeded to ignore this
intent by invoking the plain meaning-literal language approach to
statutory construction.
34. The President's March 29, 1933, message to Congress, prompting the
1933 Act, is found at S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933),
and at H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) ("supervision
of traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce"). His Feb.
9, 1934, message urging the legislation of what became the 1934 Act
is found at S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), and at H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) ("supervision of the pur-
chase and sale of all property dealt with on exchanges;" "regulating
the investment business").
35. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (emphasis added).
36. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (emphasis added).
The Conference Report on the 1933 Act reveals that there was no
disagreement between the two Houses on the purpose of the Act or
on the definition of a "security." See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1933).
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investor.'3 7 The House Report is also pregnant with the purpose
of protecting investors.38
The emphasis in all this legislative history on investment in-
struments indicates that Congress certainly was not concerned
with regulating ordinary commercial notes. This emphasis was en-
acted into law by the inclusion of the required context-over-text
method of statutory interpretation in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. It is
disappointing that the Movielab, MacAndrews and Lino courts did
not resort to this legislative history to inform themselves of the im-
port of the statute's context-over-text language which they disre-
garded.
3. Relevant Case Law
The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has breathed life
into the context-over-text language of the statute by requiring
that "in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'secur-
ity' in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the
emphasis should be on economic reality."39 That this has always
been the view of the Court is exhibited by its statement in the
early case of SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.40 that the
rules of statutory construction . . . long have been subordinated
to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in
conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text
in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the mean-
ing of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular
cases the generally expressed legislative policy.41
37. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934) (emphasis added).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1934). Again, the
Conference Report on the 1934 Act reveals no dispute as to the pur-
pose of the legislation or as to the definition of a "security." See
H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1934).
39. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), citing SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). In Tcherepnin, the Court held
that withdrawable capital shares issued by a savings and loan as-
sociation to evidence savings accounts were "securities" under the
1934 Act. In Howey the Court held that the offering of units of a
citrus grove development coupled with service contracts constituted
an offering of "investment contracts" within the meaning of § 2(1)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), defining "security" as in-
cluding any "investment contract."
40. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
41. Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added). In Joiner the Court held that
certain assignments of oil leases were "securities" under the 1933
Act. In accord with Joiner, Howey and Teherepnin is the Court's
decision in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967),
holding that a certain type of variable annuity contract was a
"security" under the 1933 Act.
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Although all of these Supreme Court pronouncements are
found in decisions holding that various instruments were securities,
the context-over-text or substance-over-form method of statutory
construction has been used to exclude other transactions from the
definitions in the federal securities laws. The Third Circuit's de-
cision in First Trust & Savings Bank v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Co.42 is particularly enlightening. In this case a customer of the
defendant Fidelity delivered to it what purported to be negoti-
able promissory notes of a whiskey distiller. Accompanying the
notes were what purported to be negotiable warehouse receipts
evidencing deposits of whiskey, which was to serve as collateral
for the notes. The purported warehouse receipts were deposited
in Fidelity's trust department, which issued in return safekeeping
receipts. The notes were left with Fidelity's collection department
along with drafts drawn by the customer in its own favor on the
plaintiff, which was to be the purchaser of the notes. Fidelity
credited its customer's account for the amount of the drafts and
charged the customer interest until the transactions were com-
pleted. Fidelity then forwarded the drafts, notes and safekeep-
ing receipts to the plaintiff in order to close the transactions. The
plaintiff in turn sent to Fidelity checks payable to the defendant's
order. When the checks cleared, Fidelity was thus reimbursed for
the credits to the customer's account. Both the notes and ware-
house receipts were in fact spurious. The plaintiff sued Fidelity
on the theory that the defendant was a "seller" under the 1933 Act.
Finding Fidelity to be a mere agent for collection performing
an ordinary banking function, the Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision that the defendant was not a "seller" of se-
curities. The court of appeals stated:
If this set of facts constitutes Fidelity a seller under the Se-
curities Act, it seems to us inevitable that every bank which ad-
vances money to a customer upon a sight draft and negotiable
bill of lading is also a seller.43
Although the court recognized that the definitions of the 1933 Act
are very broad and comprehensive, it refused to be
pushed into the startling conclusion that every bank that makes an
advance on an instrument left with it for collection, and passes
that instrument on to someone else, has become a seller under
the terms of the federal statute, if the transaction is one in inter-
state commerce.44
Although the Fidelity court never mentioned the context-over-
42. 214 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856.
43. 214 F.2d at 323.
44. Id.
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text language of the 1933 Act,4 5 every page of the opinion affirms
that the court was looking at form over substance. And although
the dispute was analyzed in terms of whether Fidelity was a
"seller," rather than in terms of whether Fidelity issued "securi-
ties," the decision is significant as a model of the type of reason-
ing compelled by the statutes themselves.
Two other cases involving private loan transactions should be
noted. Beury v. Beury40 was a stockholders' derivative action
based on allegedly fraudulent stock transactions. One of the alle-
gations was that the corporation on whose behalf the suit was
brought loaned47 at least 70,000 dollars to one of the defendants.
This portion of the case presents a situation that is the converse
of that posed in this article since the giver of the loan, through its
stockholders, was suing the recipient of the loan, as opposed to
the recipient of the credit (as is a maker of a note) suing the giver
of the credit (the payee). Nevertheless, the case is significant for
the court's view that "the $70,000 loan cannot be considered to be
a transaction in securities within the meaning of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934."148 This conclusion, however, must be viewed
as dicta since there was no allegation of damage resulting from the
loan.
The other case, SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.,49 in-
volved many transactions allegedly violative of the federal securi-
ties laws. Several of the allegations were based on loans and
notes; in not one of these transactions did the court find that the
loans or notes were securities. Its holding with respect to three
of the notes is representative of its statements regarding each of
the other loan and note transactions:
Regardless of the terms of the notes, they do not constitute se-
curities within the fair meaning of the Acts. The "personal loan"
cases relied upon by plaintiff are for the most part distinguishable.
They involve either investment contracts or a whole series of
notes, not one or two. The transactions here are individual loans.
45. Section 2 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970), states in language
identical to that found in the 1934 Act, that the definitions it sets
forth are to be used "unless the context otherwise requires."
46. 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954).
47. Although the Beury opinion does not indicate whether the loan was
evidenced by a note, there is no doubt that a writing is not essen-
tial to the existence of a security. 1 Loss 458, 488-89 (citing both
legislative history and the Supreme Court). Thus, the determina-
tion of whether a security was involved in Beury could not have
turned on whether or not the loan was evidenced by a written note.
48. 127 F. Supp. at 789. See supra note 47.
49. 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 435 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1970).
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One does not normally speak of the "purchase" or "sale" of a loan,
whether or not it is evidenced by a note.50
Again, despite the fact that the Beury and Fifth Avenue courts re-
frained from mentioning the context-over-text provisions of the
statutes, both analyzed the situations in terms of substance over
form.
In contrast, the courts in Movielab and MacAndrews chose to
rest their decisions on other judicial authority.51 Reliance in both
was placed on Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank.52
The Movielab court quoted 5  Lehigh's generalization that the "def-
inition of a security has been literally read by the judiciary to the
extent that almost all notes are held to be securities. '54  This
50. 289 F. Supp. at 38, citing Beury and 1 Loss 546.
51. The Movielab court distinguished Beury on the basis that in Beury
it did not appear whether the loan was evidenced by a note. Fifth
Avenue was distinguished because there the court treated the ques-
tion as one involving a "personal loan" rather than a "note."
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). Both distinctions are specious. With regard to Beury, it has
already been noted that the existence of a security does not depend
on the presence of a written instrument. See supra note 47. And
as to Fifth Avenue, the entire point was that the notes were not
securities because they were mere personal loans. See text accom-
panying note 50 supra. MacAndrews cited neither Beury nor Fifth
Avenue.
Both the Movielab and MacAndrews courts cited one or more of
the Supreme Court's opinions in Joiner, Howey and Tcherepnin;
both missed the principles laid down by the Court in those cases.
Movielab chose to distinguish the three Supreme Court opinions on
the basis that none of them involved notes; no mention was made
of the substance-over-form approach mandated by the cases. 321
F. Supp. at 810. MacAndrews cited Tcherepnin for the proposition
that the words used in the definition of "security" are generic words
which are to be given very broad meanings. MacAndrews & Forbes
Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1401, 1406 (D.S.C. 1972).
The court, however, did not recognize that the substance-over-form
approach can, and in appropriate cases should, be used to exclude
as well as include instruments within that definition.
52. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969). Both courts also relied on Llanos v.
United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953). For a discussion of the
features of Llanos which distinguish it from the situations presented
in Movielab, MacAndrews and Lino, see supra note 17.
53. 321 F. Supp. at 809. Again it is proper to note that the result in
Movielab may have been proper, see infra Parts HC, IVD-E, and
V, but that its reasoning was erroneous. The cases upon which the
Movielab court relied did not support its reasoning or result, al-
though other cases and reasoning could have been used to reach
that same result.
54. 409 F.2d at 991-92. The Lehigh court cited the Lianos case among
others as authority for this proposition.
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broad statement is unfortunate for at least three reasons. First, it
condones rather than condemns the plain meaning-literal language
approach in contravention of the statute's command to examine
context over text. Second, the statement simply did not depict cor-
rectly the views of the entire judiciary.55 Last, and most impor-
tant, the "security" involved in Lehigh was a loan participation
and not a note; the proposition was thus mere dicta.56
The Fifth Circuit later relied solely on its Lehigh generaliza-
tion in finding a note to be a security in Rekant v. Desser,5 7 a deriv-
ative action. The stockholders sued Desser, the president and a
director of their corporation, for fraudulently inducing the corpo-
55. The Lehigh court did cite Beury as contrary to its assertion; no
mention was made of the Fifth Avenue case, however, despite the
fact that it was also contrary to the broad generalization.
56. The Lehigh court recognized that it was not faced with a note sit-
uation: "Central Bank, however, is not charged with the sale of
the Larso Development note, but rather with the sale of the loan
participation." 409 F.2d at 992. The facts were that Larso had at-
tempted to obtain from Central Bank a loan of $325,000. Central
Bank, being able to lend Larso only $185,000, agreed to help raise
the funds by selling participation interests in a $325,000 loan evi-
denced by a note. The note was guaranteed by certain individuals
and was secured by 423,000 shares of stock in another corporation.
The prime guarantor was the power behind both Larso and the
other corporation whose stock served as collateral for the note.
Lehigh Trust purchased from Central Bank a loan participation,
and when the loan became uncollectible, Lehigh sued Central Bank
under Rule 10b-5, alleging misrepresentations and failure to dis-
close material facts relating to the credit standing of the prime
guarantor and the value of the collateral stock. The court af-
firmed a jury verdict for Lehigh and stated that the loan partici-
pation agreement "is clearly within the statutory definition of a
security as that definition includes 'any certificate of interest or
participation in . . . any of the foregoing [note, stock, etc.].'" 409
F.2d at 992.
Two features of Lehigh should be noted. First, the suit was by
the purchaser of a loan participation against its seller, not by the
maker of a note against its payee as in Movielab, MacAndrews and
Lino. Second, the case is a vivid illustration of a situation where a
note itself may not be a security while a loan participation in the
note is. That is, if the suit had been against the maker Larso on
the note itself, the dispute probably would have involved what this
article terms an "ordinary commercial note," since presumably Cen-
tral Bank was the payee and the transaction was a simple, albeit
large, bank loan. On the other hand, since the suit was against Cen-
tral Bank on the loan participation, the decision of the court was
probably correct because Central Bank essentially had offered and
sold to an apparently large group of persons participations in the
Larso enterprise. Such persons might properly be viewed as inves-
tors.
57. 425 F.2d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 1970).
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
ration to issue to him treasury shares and a note for grossly in-
adequate consideration.5" The case is superficially similar to the
situation presented by the questions posed in this article because
the stockholders, suing derivatively on behalf of the corporate
maker, sought recovery against the payee of the note. But it was
unnecessary to find the note to be a security. The stock and the
note were issued in the same transaction, and the stock was cer-
tainly a "security" sufficient in itself to support the Rule 10b-5
action; the federal court would have had jurisdiction over the en-
tire controversy, including the note aspects, under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction. 59
The Movielab and MacAndrews courts cited other lower fed-
eral court decisions to support their findings that the notes in ques-
tion were securities. Both courts cited SEC v. Vanco, Inc.60 In
that case more than six hundred former shareholders of a bankrupt
58. The grossly inadequate consideration was a 167 acre parcel of land
purchased by the corporation for $1,100,000 but allegedly worth only$150,000. The corporation paid for the land by issuing to Desser
the treasury shares and note. In the context presented, it is doubt-
ful that the note should have been treated as a security since the
transaction involved merely the issuance of a single note in exchange
for a single piece of property. The note was not given for the general
financing of the corporation. Furthermore, there was no offering
of notes to several or many persons: the negotiations were solely
between two persons, the corporation and Desser. For a more com-
plete enumeration of the factors by which the note might have
been characterized, see infra Part IV.
Of course the stock was properly treated as securities, but it is
not unusual for assets to be purchased by the issuance of securities
and the giving of other property which is not a security. Witness
especially the case of Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956),
strikingly similar to Rekant in several respects. In Errion the
plaintiff had been fraudulently induced by the defendant to give
him stock, notes, an annuity insurance policy and three conditional
sales contracts for realty, in exchange for land owned by the de-
fendant and his corporations. Although the court did not specifi-
cally discuss whether the notes were securities, it quite properly
framed the issue as "whether a district court under the Act of 1934
has jurisdiction when there is a single transaction or scheme which
involves both securities and non-securities." Id. at 453-54 (empha-
sis in the original). The court proceeded to hold that the securi-
ties involved supported a Rule 10b-5 action cognizable on its own in
the district court, and that the district court properly awarded dam-
ages for the entire scheme even though non-securities were in-
volved. The holding was based on the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction.
59. See supra note 58; 1 Loss 1006; 5 id. at 2960-67; 6 id. at 3604-05.
See generally C. WRiGaT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 19 (2d ed. 1970).
60. 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958).
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corporation were solicited to advance at least ten per cent of the
amount of their original investment in the corporation to Vanco.
"In exchange, a subscribing shareholder would receive the defend-
ant's renewable promissory note maturing in six months and an
interest in Vanco, Inc. represented by shares of its capital stock."61
The court held that it was unlawful for Vanco "to use the mails
to sell or offer to sell these notes and stock interests" without
registration.6 2  Even if the stock aspects of the case were not
present, it is unquestionable that the case involved the public of-
fering of investment notes to prospective investors. That the pub-
licly-offered notes in Vanco should be characterized differently
than the notes in Movielab, MacAndrews and Lino is equally
clear.
The case of SEC v. Addison63 also appeared in both Movielab
and MacAndrews. In Addison the defendants issued notes to ap-
proximately four hundred persons "for the stated purpose of fi-
nancing the defendants' mining operations. 6 4 Written agreements
were delivered to the lenders stating that the defendants would
execute contracts conveying to the lenders a percentage interest
in the income and profits derived from the mining operations and
properties. The court succinctly described the case when it said:
[T]he defendants needed money to get into operation and ...
in order to finance such operation, they were soliciting uncondi-
tional unsecured loans of money from members of the general pub-
lic.65
Again there can be no doubt that the persons solicited in Addison
were prospective investors; the notes involved were true invest-
ment instruments. The same court that decided Addison explicitly
recognized this as the basis for that opinion in the recent case of
McClure v. First National Bank,66 a thoughtful decision involving
a suit by the maker of ordinary commercial notes against their
payees which reaches a result opposite from Movielab, MacAn-
drews and Lino.
Both Movielab and MacAndrews also cited Whitlow & Associ-
ates, Ltd. v. Intermountain Brokers, Inc.,67 a suit by a principal
against its agent for violations of Rule 10b-5 and the 1933 Act.
61. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
64. Id. at 715.
65. Id.
66. 352 F. Supp. 454, 461 (N.D. Tex. 1973). The McClure case will be
discussed in detail shortly.
67. 252 F. Supp. 943 (D. Hawaii 1966).
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The agent repeatedly had assured his principal that he would
be able to place a loan of 550,000 dollars for it. After un-
successfully contacting several prospective lenders, the negotia-
tions finally settled on Intermountain. A good faith depsoit of
11,000 dollars was given to Intermountain, which declared a for-
feiture of the deposit as a result of an inappropriately-worded let-
ter by the agent. The principal sought the return of its 11,000 dol-
lars. The court, relying heavily on Vanco and Addison, both
clearly distinguishable, found for the principal. Although argu-
ably this case involved an investment note,6 it is submitted that
if the transactions had been subjected to the criteria suggested in
Part IV of this article, then the note would have been found to be
an ordinary commercial note not falling within the federal securi-
ties laws. In any event, Whitlow does not provide authority per-
suasive enough to support the MacAndrews or Lino decisions since
those cases did not involve notes arguably falling within the gray
area between investment notes and ordinary commercial notes.
And at best the case gives some support to the Movielab result,
since the notes in Movielab probably did fall within that gray
area; still, little could be done to salvage Movielab's reasoning.
The Movielab court also cited Olympic Capital Corp. v. New-
man 9 and Prentice v. Hsu.7 0 In Olympic it was "not questioned by
any party" that the note involved was a security. The court merely
cited one case71 on this point and proceeded to discuss more fully
the question of whether there was a "sale" of that security. In
Prentice the payee of certain notes sued the maker, alleging fraud
under the 1933 Act and Rule 10b-5. The payee alleged that
he had been induced to advance money in exchange for the
notes by the maker's false promise that he would invest more
than 1,000,000 dollars in stock of the payee's corporation, and by the
maker's misrepresentations that he had a valuable contract which
he would assign to the corporation and that he had a secret cache
of securities and cash in Formosa which he would make available
for investment in the corporation. The advance was to be used to
retrieve the hidden valuables in Formosa.
The court's opinion in Prentice, more concerned with the mak-
68. The agent had apparently solicited unsuccessfully several prospec-
tive lenders to finance his principal's proposed leasehold venture;
this aspect of the case arguably involved a public offering, though
the inference is weak.
69. 276 F. Supp. 646 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
70. 280 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
71. Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953). See supra
note 17.
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er's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination than with
securities law, briefly held that the notes were securities on the au-
thority of two cases which involved public offerings of notes.7 2 It
seems that a better basis for the decision would have been that
there was an offer, an acceptance, and therefore a technical sale of
the stock; thus, there was a fraudulent purchase of stock on the part
of the maker since the transaction was "in connection with the pur-
chase . .. of any security. 73 That the stock was never issued to
the maker is of no import; the failure was the result of the fraud
itself. Furthermore, the misrepresentation in a Rule 10b-5 action
need not relate to the security itself.7 4 Certainly from the payee's
standpoint the transactions were incident to the maker's promised
investment of 1,000,000 dollars in the corporation's stock. Neither
the Prentice case with its extremely superficial analysis on the
note issue, nor the Olympic case, where the issue was not even
contested, provides a solid foundation for the Movielab reasoning.
Thus, the decisions in Movielab, MacAndrews and Lino were all
based on faulty reasoning. None of the three courts recognized the
instruction on the face of the statute that the context should gov-
ern the text. None of them utilized the legislative history behind
the federal securities laws; such history would have revealed Con-
gress' preoccupation with the purpose of protecting investors and
the absence of any purpose of protecting those who extend or re-
ceive credit in ordinary commercial transactions. Finally, none of
them adequately analyzed the problem in terms of the substance
over form approach mandated by the Supreme Court itself and
properly followed by other federal courts. Instead, all three of
them relied on cases inapposite to the situations before them.
C. THE CASES CON
In contrast to the tenuous reasoning of the Movielab, MacAn-
drews and Lino decisions, the two cases reaching a contrary result
present a more satisfying analysis. In Joseph v. Norman's Health
Club, Inc.7 5 the plaintiffs in four consolidated class actions sued
the payees of notes on two theories. The first was that the plain-
tiffs, the makers of the notes, were fraudulently induced to give
their notes to the payees in exchange for lifetime memberships in
the Health Club. The payees endorsed the notes over to finance
72. Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953) and SEC v.
Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958).
73. See supra notes 1, 4.
74. 6 Loss 3604.
75. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
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companies. This theory was based on Rule 10b-5; the premise was
that the makers were "sellers" of "securities"-and the notes were
the "securities." Implicit in this theory is the allegation that the
payees were "purchasers" of the "securities" and that the violation
was a "fraudulent purchase. '76 The alleged fraud consisted of
material misrepresentations and omissions relating to the payees'
failure to disclose the cash price of the services sold, information
concerning finance charges, and the failing financial condition of
the Health Clubs. The same misrepresentations formed the grounds
for the second theory, founded on alleged violations of the federal
Truth-in-Lending Act.77
The court in analyzing the securities issue was careful to note
the "plaintiffs [did] not allege that they purchased a security ' 7 -
rather they alleged that they were sellers of securities. After rec-
ognizing that several courts had read the statute literally to find
almost all notes to be securities,79 the Joseph court proceeded to
analyze the case before it in terms of context-over-text. The court
first cited the Supreme Court decisions in Howey and Tcherepnin
for the proposition that the definition of "security" is flexible, not
static. The court then held "that the context of the present case
* . . requires that the promissory note is other than a security
within the meaning of" the 1934 Act.80 The court also stated:
76. See supra note 4.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
78. 336 F. Supp. at 313.
79. The court cited the Rekant, Llanos, Olympic, Whitlow and Lehigh
cases. Id.
80. 336 F. Supp. at 313. The court throughout its opinion relied heavily
on both the lower and appellate court opinions in City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Ark. 1968), affd, 422 F.2d
221 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905. The facts in Vander-
boom are set forth supra in note 8. It should be remembered that
in Vanderboom the theory of the defendant-maker was not that he
was a seller of securities, but that the payee engaged in a fraudulent
sale of stock. In response to this position the district court stated,
290 F. Supp. at 608-09:
The short answer to defendants' contention is that the
plaintiff bank did not sell or offer to sell any security of
any kind to the defendants. The defendants approached
the bank and expressed a desire to borrow money which
they, of their own volition, intended to use in the purchase
of the capital stock of a corporation, Investors Thrift Cor-
poration, organized by themselves [to purchase all of the
stock in the corporation owned by the bank's agent and
others]. When the proceeds of the notes were delivered to
the defendants, the money belonged to them and they
could use it in any manner. The fact that they purchased
the stock of and from their own corporation with the pro-
ceeds of the notes is not sufficient to hold the plaintiff bank
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Plaintiffs alleged that they sold the promissory notes to the
Health Clubs who thereafter sold the notes to the finance compa-
nies. However, the allegation of a "sale" does not confer standing
if the context reveals that the "sale" of the notes was not the sale
of a security.81
The Joseph court's due regard for the context-over-text language
of the statute, and for the substance-over-form cases, is laudable.
And the result can hardly be questioned since it cannot be doubted
that the payees, as the alleged purchasers of securities, were not
"investing" in the individual makers' notes.
The analysis in the recent case of McClure v. First National
Bank,8 2 the second case contrary to Movielab, MacAndrews and
Lino, is even more thorough. The plaintiff-maker of the notes in
question owned half of the stock of a corporation. One of the de-
fendants was the general manager of the corporation. The maker
liable under the undisputed facts as found and commented
upon by the court.
There is no testimony to show that the plaintiff bank
used the mails or any other instrument of interstate com-
merce in loaning the money.
In Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 1963),
218 F. Supp. 473, the court stated at page 476:
"So far as we perceive, Congress did not undertake to
regulate those transactions effected by direct person-to-
person contact and negotiation. We are not here con-
cerned with abstract considerations of power, but with
actual manifestations of Congressional purpose and in-
tent."
In affirming the district court's opinion, the Eighth Circuit indicated
that the defendant-makers should have sued derivatively on behalf
of Investors Thrift, the real purchaser of the stock of the agent's
corporation. 422 F.2d at 228. But the court proceeded to agree
with the lower court's conclusion that even if the agent had per-
petrated a fraud, that fraud could not be imputed to the payee-bank;
the claim was thus not properly against the payee. Id. at 231.
81. 336 F. Supp. at 313-14. The court then assumed arguendo that the
makers were sellers of securities and found that even were this
true, the undisclosed finance charges did not bring the case within
the coverage of the 1934 Act. The court reasoned "that a reasonable
investor (distinguished from a consumer debtor), in the exercise of
due care, was not entitled to receive disclosure from the defendants
that the note executed by him to the Health Club would thereafter
be sold to a finance company." Id. at 315. This matter, the court
concluded, was not the proper subject of a securities dispute, but
rather should be viewed in the context of the claim based on the
Truth-in-Lending Act.
The fact that the payees offered the club memberships to the
general public did not play a role in the court's decision. But this
is not surprising since the case was brought on the theory that the
individual makers-not the payees-were the sellers of securities.
82. 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
complained that the manager and an officer of the defendant bank
had represented to her that the corporation needed to borrow
200,000 dollars from the bank in order to satisfy the corporation's
business debts. The maker, relying on these representations, exe-
cuted a note as the corporation's secretary. The manager also ex-
ecuted the note, which was made payable to the bank. The corpo-
ration, purportedly acting through the maker and the manager, ex-
ecuted and delivered a deed of trust to secure the note. The
maker further alleged that, instead of the proceeds of the note be-
ing applied to the debts of the corporation, the 200,000 dollars
was used to pay a debt owed by the manager to the bank, and that
this misapplication was made with the full knowledge of all the
defendants and pursuant to a fraud and conspiracy among them.
Two and one-half years later the maker executed a separate col-
lateral agreement pledging to the payee part of her stock in the
corporation and in another corporation. The purpose of this later
transaction was to secure a new note renewing and extending the
original one. One and one-half years later the bank foreclosed on
the corporation's property. The maker sued under Rule 10b-5.
The court squarely faced the issue whether the notes were "se-
curities." In quoting the definition of that term the court recog-
nized the context-over-text language of the statute. Citing Beury
it noted that the definition could not be given an absolutely literal
interpretation,
for to do so would be to place under the coverage of the Act
many day-to-day loan transactions unrelated to the fraud-related
abuses which Congress in 1934 was attempting to regulate.8 3
The court cited the Joseph case and noted its reliance on Vander-
boom, stating that in Joseph "the court held that the context of
the transactions placed them outside the purview of the Act, since
the statute defines a note as a security 'unless the context other-
wise requires."',, 4 After quoting the Supreme Court in Joiner, the
court concluded that substance must govern form, and that the
only notes covered by the Act are those which are sold or traded
for speculative or investment purposes in the same manner that
stocks, bonds or debentures might be traded. The court held "that
the transactions involved amount to little more than ordinary com-
mercial loans not intended to be covered by the Act."8 5
But the analysis did not stop there. The court also found it sig-
nificant that, by passing the Truth-in-Lending Act, Congress had
83. Id. at 465.
84. Id. at 457.
85. Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added).
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in effect determined that the 1934 Act is inapplicable to consumer
loans, and by statutory implication, to commercial loans also. The
need that Congress felt for a new statute to curb abuses in the
consumer loan area precluded the notion that the lawmakers felt
that such abuses could be reached under the 1934 Act. The court
noted that
in 15 U.S.C. § 1603, a section within the Truth in Lending Act,
Congress in setting forth transactions outside the purview of the
Truth in Lending Act lists "credit transactions ... for business
or commercial purposes" and "transactions in securities" as two
different types of transactions. Thus it is clear that most, if not all,
ordinary commercial loans are not "securities" as defined by Con-
gress as recently as 1968. Should Congress wish to place such
commercial loans under federal regulation, it need only enact a
statute similar in form to the Truth in Lending Act. It is not
within the proper province of this Court to extend the scope of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 beyond the point where Congress
has chosen to act.8 6
The McClure court then made the following statements, which
accurately characterize what the results should have been in at
least MacAndrews and Lino:
Thus these particular notes and transactions are not "securities"
within the meaning of the Act. But even if these instruments com-
plained of are securities, the transactions complained of must con-
stitute the "purchase or sale" of such securities in order for liability
to exist under the Act and in order for this Court to have jurisdic-
tion over the present complaint. The Court holds that these trans-
actions do not constitute the "purchase or sale" of securities and
that for this additional reason plaintiff has not a cause of action
under federal law.87
This holding is in complete accord with the view that "one does
not normally speak of the 'purchase' or 'sale' of a loan, whether
or not it is evidenced by a note," as expressed in SEC v. Fifth
Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.88
The court in McClure then discussed and approved of the deci-
sions in Addison and Rekant; it also agreed with the result in
86. Id. at 458 (emphasis in the original). The exemption from the
Truth-in-Lending Act for securities transactions, referred to by the
court, actually reads: "Transactions in securities or commodities ac-
counts by a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 1603(2) (1970). Obviously there
are many securities transactions not falling within that exemption.
Nevertheless, the truth of the implication drawn by the court from
the separate treatment of this exemption and the exemption for
"commercial" transactions cannot be doubted from a theoretical
standpoint. See infra Part IV.
87. 352 F. Supp. at 458.
88. 289 F. Supp. 3, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Movielab. The unimpeachability of the Addison case already has
been discussed. 9 But this writer must disagree with the line
which the McClure court drew between its situation and that
presented in Rekant. The McClure court quite properly noted that
in Rekant the corporation just as easily could have given stock or
some other form of security instead of a note for the land it pur-
chased. Indeed, the corporation had issued treasury shares to Desser
as part of the purchase price. But the test derived from this fact
by the McClure court cannot be accepted literally:
Thus where the transaction complained of is one where the issu-
ance of a note rather than shares of stock is merely a technical
difference in form, since defendant in exchange for the land could
have taken an instrument more usually thought of as a security
(such as additional shares of stock), there is jurisdiction under the
Act.90
Although this test is couched in substance-over-form language,
its logic is faulty. Were it true that a note is a security when-
ever stock could be substituted for the note as payment for what-
ever is purchased by the note, then virtually every purchase of an
asset by a corporation or loan by a shareholder to his corporation
would involve a security. Many corprations purchase assets by
giving notes to the vendor. Those corporations with many shares
of stock in their treasuries, or with many shares of authorized but
unissued stock, could indeed pay for such assets by issuing a few
shares of stock instead of giving notes. But if instead the directors
choose to retain the stock and give a note for the assets, can it
seriously be contended that the transaction involves the selling of
a security by the corporation? Similarly, a shareholder who has
made a bona fide loan to his corporation without taking any evi-
dence of the debt might later receive a note from the corporation.
Does the note become a security merely because the corporation
could have given the shareholder some form of redeemable secu-
rity instead of the note? The logical extensions of the McClure
court's line-drawing would be absurd.
But although the McClure court's test misses the mark, it is
submitted that the court was pointing in the right direction. Were
the test framed in terms of the nature of the transactions involved
and whether stock actually in practice is given in such transac-
tions, rather than being framed in terms of the form of payment
and whether stock could have been given instead of what was
given, then the test would provide a more discerning analysis.
That is, a test of whether the transaction is of the kind in which
stock often actually is given would not be inappropriate. Such a
89. See text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
90. 352 F. Supp. at 459 (emphasis added).
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test would embody many, if not all, of the more specific criteria
suggested in Part IV of this article.
The court's test aside, McClure's approval of Rekant's determi-
nation that the note there involved was a security was unneces-
sary because that determination itself was unnecessary: the Re-
kant court could have reached the same result on a more satisfying
basis by invoking the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.91 The Mc-
Clure court's approval of the Movielab result was probably better
placed. The court by invoking its new test analogized the facts
in Movielab to
the formal equivalent of the common merger acquisition whereby
Corporation A purchases the assets of Corporation B and issues its
own stock in payment. In Movielab, Corporation A merely issued
a note in place of its stock.92
The court's thrust, consistent with its test, was that stock could
have been issued instead of the note. Had the McClure court
applied the suggested test of whether the transaction was of the
type wherein stock often is issued, then the same conclusion would
have been reached by better reasoning. Hence, Movielab did in-
volve a major asset acquisition closely analogous to a merger, and
stock often is given in transactions of that nature. It is also sig-
nificant that the McClure court rejected the view of the district
court in Movielab that the Fifth Avenue case was totally inappli-
cable: McClure embraced the Fifth Avenue case as authority for
its result despite the fact that the trial court in Movielab had dis-
missed the case as unpersuasive. 93
The McClure court finally reached the recent decision in Sand-
ers v. John Nuveen & Co.,94 and again it was on more solid ground.
The court in Sanders held that certain short-term commercial
paper, offered and sold to the general public, were securities de-
spite the fact that the paper fell within the literal exemption of
short-term notes from the definition of "security" in the 1934 Act.95
Although the holding in Sanders was no doubt correct, 96 the Mc-
Clure court correctly noted the overreaching found in Sanders'
dicta:
91. See supra notes 58 and 59 and accompanying text.
92. 352 F. Supp. at 461.
93. Id. at 460.
94. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
95. See supra note 5.
96. For an article urging the need for protection for investors in such
short-term paper, see Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and
the Securities Acts, 39 U. Cat. L. REv. 362 (1972).
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The Sanders court suggests indirectly that all notes having a
maturity of more than nine months can be reached by the Act.
With such reasoning this Court disagrees. Sanders does provide,
however, a useful and cogent distinction between two different
kinds of notes: commercial (not covered by the Act, in the view
of this Court) and investment (covered by the Act). The former
is created "when a prospective borrower approaches a bank for a
loan and gives his note in consideration for it." The latter is cre-
ated when a person "seeks to invest his money and receives a note
in return for it."... This Court holds that all notes in the latter
category, regardless of maturity, are under the Act and that no
notes in the former category having a maturity not exceeding nine
months are under the Act. The instant case involves notes in the
former category with maturity greater than nine months. In such
a circumstance, this Court holds that jurisdiction under the Act
must be determined by looking at the particular instruments in-
volved in light of Congressional intent. After doing so, this Court
concludes that the instant case must be dismissed.97
Despite what this writer believes to be misplaced confidence in
the Rekant case, and despite a slightly off-track test found in the
opinion, the McClure decision taken as a whole provides a very
thorough and satisfying analysis of the questions posed in this
article.
The decisions in Joseph and McClure stand in stark relief
against the bleak backdrop created by the reasoning in Movielab,
MacAndrews and Lino. Only the former two cases recognized
and gave effect to the principles of context-over-text and sub-
stance-over-form. That this was Congress' intent there can be no
doubt.
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER
Both procedural and substantive benefits inure to the plaintiff-
maker if he is allowed to sue the payee in federal court under the
1934 Act.
A. SuBsTANIVE RmICATIONS
By affording the maker a right of action under the 1934 Act, an
affirmative answer to the questions posed in this article relieves
the federal courts of the obligations of the Erie doctrine, requiring
the application of state substantive law in diversity cases.98 The
effects would be felt in at least four substantive areas: the ele-
ments of proof requisite for recovery, the liability of "controlling
persons" under the 1934 Act, the security for expenses require-
97. 352 F. Supp. at 461 (emphasis added in the third sentence).
98. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ments of many states in derivative suits, and the application of the
anti-waiver provision of the 1934 Act.
1. Comparative Ease of Proof Under Rule 10b-5
It has been noted already that it is easier to recover for securi-
ties fraud under Rule 10b-5 than under state law.99 Specifically,
the state blue-sky laws generally limit recovery to purchasers and
thus would be inapplicable to suits by makers, as sellers, against
payees, as purchasers. 0 0 This would relegate the maker in the
state courts to the position of having to seek a common law rem-
edy. If his cause of action is deceit, he will be faced with the sticky
problems of proving the elements of scienter, justifiable reliance,
and causation, which "have been difficult for plaintiffs in securi-
ties cases. And non-disclosure cases have rarely been action-
able."''1 1 Furthermore, while rescission "is the simplest of the
non-statutory remedies,"'1 2 because the maker avoids the barriers
of causation and scienter, this remedy would be unavailable in
many cases due to "rescission's own peculiar prerequisites of 'priv-
ity' between the parties and ability to restore ... the status
quo."'o3
In contrast, the maker would have an easier time under Rule
10b-5. Although the elements of a Rule 10b-5 action somewhat
resemble the elements of the common law actions, "the principle
stretching by 10b-5 has been in recognizing non-disclosure and
[virtually] dispensing with scienter."'' 0 4 In fact, "the courts have
repeatedly said that the fraud provisions in the SEC acts . . . are
not limited to circumstances which would give rise to a common
law action for deceit."' 0 5
Generally, some sort of scienter is required in a Rule 10b-5 ac-
tion, but that element has been extremely watered-down by the
federal courts. 0 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in the celebrated Texas Gulf Sulfur case'0 7 flatly stated:
"Whether the case before us is treated solely as an SEC enforce-
ment proceeding or as a private action, proof of a specific intent
to defraud is unnecessary."'10 8 At least four of the nine judges in
99. See supra note 1.
100. See 1 BROWBERG § 2.7(2).
101. 1 id. at § 2.7(1).
102. 3 Loss 1626.
103. Id. at 1627.
104. 2 BROMBERG § 8.1.
105. 3 Loss 1435.
106. See generally 6 id. at 3883-88.
107. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
108. Id. at 854 (emphasis added).
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Texas Gulf Sulfur indicated that they would be willing to impose
liability for negligence alone, and various other courts have held
more squarely that negligence suffices for Rule 10b-5 liability.109
Several other courts have even done away with the scienter ele-
ment altogether, virtually imposing absolute liability for a viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5.11 0 And while some courts at common law have
also relaxed the scienter requirement of fraud,1 . it would seem
that the frequency and degree of relaxation in Rule 10b-5 cases
provide a strong temptation for the plaintiff to choose a federal
over a state forum.
Similarly, Rule 10b-5 cases have indicated a relaxation of the
common law element of reliance-or perhaps more accurately, a
blurring of that element with other fraud elements:
The courts regularly say that reliance by the defrauded party
is necessary for recovery under Rule 10b-5. But closer inspection
and analysis suggests that this is an oversimplification. More ac-
curately, reliance and causation are no longer clearly distinguish-
able requirements inter se or relative to privity and materiality.
Rather, they have become partially interchangeable and various
combinations of one or two of them suffice in different situations.
In nondisclosure cases, reliance has little if any rational role.
One court . . . indicated the need for active reliance on the de-
fendant's silence, either because plaintiff had in mind the negative
of the matter concealed, or because he deliberately trusted defend-
ant's advice. But this notion was repudiated by the Second Cir-
cuit when it [said:] "The proper test is whether the plaintiff would
have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the de-
fendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact." It is mean-
ingless to talk of reliance in any more active sense in open-market
situations. Moreover, the quoted view represents causation as
much as anything else.112
Others have agreed that causation, rather than reliance, should be
the focus of the inquiry in Rule 10b-5 actions,"13 and although it
can hardly be doubted that causation is an essential element in
such actions, 1 4 "it is far from clear how proximate the causa-
tion must be."" 5
Thus, it is clear that if ordinary commercial notes are indeed
securities, the maker would have an easier time in proving the
109. See cases collected at 2 BROWMERG § 8.4(585) (1).
110. See 6 Loss 3886-87; 2 BRONMBERG § 8.4(630).
111. See 4 Loss 1432; 6 id. at 3883.
112. 2 BRonERG § 8.6(1) (footnotes omitted; quoting from List v. Fash-
ion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) ).
113. See 6 Loss 3878-80 (discussing the government's amicus curiae
memorandum on the petition for a writ of certiorari in the List
case).
114. See 6 id. at 3880-83.
115. 2 BROMBERG § 8.7 (1).
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elements of his action in the federal courts under Rule 10b-5 than
in the state courts.
2. Liability of 'Controlling Persons' Under the 1934 Act
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act" 6 imposes liability upon persons
who are "in control" of violators of the Act, subject to the affirma-
tive defense that the controlling person acted in good faith and
did not induce the violation. Thus, in the context of the situation
presented in this article, a maker of an ordinary commercial note
prima facie could recover against the parent of a subsidiary payee,
even if the corporate veil would not be pierced by state courts
under the more conventional common law doctrine. This was
precisely the case in Lino, where the maker sued the payee's parent
corporation under Rule 10b-5. 7  So yet another important sub-
stantive benefit is conferred upon the maker by allowing him to
sue under the 1934 Act: the possibility of recovering against a per-
son other than the payee who may be a more viable defendant
than the payee himself. 8
116. 15U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970):
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any
person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and
did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts con-
stituting the violation or cause of action.
Although the 1934 Act itself does not define what a "controlling per-
son" is, the concept would clearly include controlling shareholders,
parent corporations and principals for the acts of their agents. Cf.
SEC Reg. C, Rule 405(f), 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1972) (promul-
gated under the 1933 Act); ALI FED. SEC. CoDE § 221 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1972).
In one Rule 10b-5 action, a national brokerage firm was held
liable for the acts of one of its wire correspondents. Hawkins v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark.
1949). In Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956), the partners of
a New York broker-dealer firm were held liable as controlling per-
sons for a California broker-dealer corporation's violations of Rule
10b-5. The president of the California corporation was a close
friend of several of the New York partners, and much of the capital
for the violator was supplied by wives and relatives of the partners.
The New York firm paid for a direct wire between the two offices,
but neither the partners, nor their wives and relatives, participated
in the affairs of the violator. See generally 3 Loss 1808-11.
117. See supra text accompanying note 27.
118. Furthermore, the person who is controlled need not be made a de-
fendant for the person in control to be liable. DeMarco v. Edens,
390 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1968) (involving section 15 of the 1933
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3. Security for Expenses Requirements in Derivative Suits
Recalling that the Beury and Rekant cases were stockholder de-
rivative actions, it would not be surprising to find many other de-
rivative suits arising where shareholders on behalf of corporate
makers sue the payees of notes. Many states have statutes either
requiring or allowing the courts to require the shareholder-plain-
tiff to post security for the defendants' expenses, including attor-
neys fees, in certain circumstances. 119 Such statutes are substan-
tive in that they create a new liability-indemnification by the
plaintiff of the designated defendants' expenses of litigation under
certain circumstances. These requirements are "insurmountable
by many plaintiffs.' 1 20 But the shareholder, suing derivatively on
behalf of the corporate maker, would escape these obstacles in a
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970), the 1933 Act counterpart of the 1934 Act
§ 20 (a)).
An interesting problem would arise where, for example, a cor-
poration in need of cash sells a note obtained by it through fraud to
a controlling shareholder who participates in no way in the corpora-
tion's management. Assume that the shareholder purchases the
note from the corporation for value, in good faith, and without no-
tice of the fraud. He is thus a holder in due course under UNIomvr
CoMMcRIAL Cons § 3-302. (This assumes that the note is not a "se-
curity" under Code section 8-102 and therefore is not covered by
Article 8 of the Code. For a discussion of the relation of Article
8 to the questions posed in this article, see infra Part IVD.) Upon
the maker's default, the shareholder sues the maker in federal
court, there being diversity of citizenship. The controlling state
law is the Uniform Commercial Code. The maker not only sets
up the fraud as a defense, but also counterclaims against the
shareholder under Rule lOb-5. The maker's theory is that the note
is a security which was purchased from him fraudulently and that
the shareholder is liable under the 1934 Act, § 20(a) as a controlling
person. Assume further that the fraud was not in the factum and
is thus no defense as against a holder in due course under Code § 3-
305. The practical result is that the shareholder must prove that he
is a holder in due course not only to recover against the maker, but
also to escape liability under § 20(a) by establishing his good faith
defense. The 1934 Act, § 29(b), which voids contracts made in vio-
lation of the Act as regards the rights of certain persons, would not
affect this result because by definition a holder in due course does
not acquire his rights "with actual knowledge" of the fraud. 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
119. See, e.g., CAL. CoRp. CoDE § 834(b) (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. Bus.
Coap. LAw § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Cf. MODEL BusiNEss COR-
PORATIoN AcT § 49 (1969) (providing for both security for expenses
and indemnification upon judgment where no security was re-
quired).
120. 1 BROMBEEG § 2.5 (2).
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Rule 10b-5 action. 1 21  Thus, another substantive advantage is
gained by being able to sue in the federal courts.
4. The Anti-Waiver Provision of the 1934 Act
Section 29 (a) of the 1934 Act 122 states:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange re-
quired thereby shall be void.
In 1953 the Supreme Court construed the almost-identical language
of section 14 of the 1933 Act 1 23 to void an agreement to
arbitrate any future dispute that might arise between a broker-
age firm and its customer. 2 4 No doubt the same construction
would apply also to the 1934 Act's provision. 2 5 If the maker of
an ordinary commercial note has a case under the 1934 Act, he
could thus avoid an otherwise binding arbitration agreement.
B. PROCEDURAL RAMIFICATIONS
Not only does allowing a maker to bring a Rule 10b-5 action
have the potential for drastically altering the substantive rights of
the parties to the maker's advantage, but it also can aid him pro-
cedurally. The procedural benefits arise from both the 1934
Act itself and from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1. The 1934 Act
Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 2 6 which confers exclusive jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts for claims arising from the Act,127 also
121. The leading case is McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d
Cir. 1961). It should be noted that § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(e) (1970), contains a security for expenses provision. But that
section is inapplicable to the implied private rights of action under
Rule 10b-5; since the maker could sue the payee only under the 1934
Act, he could not be compelled to post security by the 1933 Act. See
3 Loss 1836-42; 1 BROMBERG § 2.5(2); 2 id. at §§ 9.3, 11.7; supra note
4.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
124. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
125. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182-83 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966) ("Distinction would seem un-
likely"). See generally 3 Loss 1811-17.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
127. It should be recalled that the federal courts probably would have
pendent jurisdiction over the entire controversy between the maker
and the payee even though certain of the issues might not be cog-
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gives the plaintiff a wide choice of venues. The action may be
brought in any district wherein "any act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred" or "in the district where the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business."'128 This usually
would allow the maker to sue in the district where he lives or
where his business is located. Furthermore, "process in such cases
may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.''1 2 9 Such na-
tionwide service of process could benefit greatly a maker who re-
sides in a state with no long-arm statute or with a narrow long-
arm statute. Thus, by suing in federal court the maker could
obtain jurisdiction over a payee who might be immune from suit
in the state courts because process could not be served on him.
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
It is well recognized that the procedural rules which operate
in the federal courts are more liberal than the rules in many states
in such areas as pleading and joinder. But an even more impor-
tant benefit could inure to the maker under the Federal Rules:
the availability of the class action, a device which has proved to be
"especially useful in cases involving securities frauds."'8 0 This de-
vice, unavailable altogether or available only to a more limited ex-
tent in many states, has already been invoked by makers of or-
dinary commercial notes attempting to sue payees under Rule 10b-
5.131 And it is a fact of legal life that the threat of having to dd-
fend a costly class action has coerced many defendants into settle-
ments favorable to the proposed representatives of the class. The
proper use and unfortunate abuse of the class action device thus
also would be available to makers of ordinary commercial notes
were they allowed to sue payees in the federal courts under the
1934 Act.
It cannot be doubted that the substantive and procedural ad-
vantages of a federal forum would lead many makers of ordinary
commercial notes to choose Rule 10b-5 as the vehicle by which to
air their cases. The ramifications of the affirmative answers given
nizable on their own in the federal courts. See supra notes 58 and 59
and accompanying text.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. C. WhiGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 312 (2d ed. 1970).
131. Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo.
1971) (summary judgment granted against the makers on the securi-
ties issue; class action held maintainable on the remaining claim
Ibased on the Truth-in-Lending Act).
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to the issues presented in this article by the Movielab, MacAndrews
and Lino courts would thus not remain isolated. And while "flood
of litigation" arguments should never be used to deprive persons of
rights which they are intended to have, the federal courts should
not open their doors to the makers of ordinary commercial notes
when it is recognized that the federal securities laws exist for the
protection of investors.1 32
IV. SUGGESTED CRITERIA
It may be easier to conclude that ordinary commercial notes
should not be treated as securities, while investment notes should
be so treated, than it is to determine just how that distinction is
to be made in any particular case. The courts must resolve the
issue by closely analyzing the facts in each case, always keeping
the principles of context-over-text and substance-over-form firmly
fixed before them as the overriding guide. The list of suggestions
that follows is by no means exhaustive. Only one of the factors
discussed should be determinative; none of the others is intended
to be controlling. Many of the factors present inquiries into mat-
ters of degree.
A. CoIVlVION EXPECTATIONS
The Supreme Court twice has stated the test of whether a par-
ticular instrument is a security as: "What character the instru-
ment is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of
distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the pros-
pect.' 1 33 This test itself is of no concrete help. Rather, it merely
puts the inquiry into the proper frame of reference: How would
reasonable businessmen in the commercial world characterize the
instrument? But as a generalized statement of the issue the test
is useful. It serves here as the starting point for a list of factors
which seek to give life to that test.
B. USE OF THE PROCEEDS 1 34
The analysis suggested by this factor follows a two-step ap-
proach. The first inquiry is whether the maker of the note used
132. See supra Part 11B2.
133. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967), quoting
SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943) (emphasis
added).
134. This factor is suggested by the court's discussion of the Truth-in-
Lending Act in McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454, 458
(N.D. Tex. 1973).
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the proceeds to purchase consumer goods' 35 or services as opposed
to using the funds for an essentially business purpose. If the an-
swer to this inquiry is that the note was given in a consumer
transaction, then that determination should conclusively establish
that the note is not a security for several reasons. Most important
is the fact, noted by the McClure court,1 3 6 that Congress has pro-
vided an entirely separate regulatory scheme for the protection of
consumers, excluding from that scheme commercial and securities
transactions. Also, the makers and payees of consumer notes are
well protected under the Uniform Commercial Code. The payee is
protected by Article 9 of the Code, and particularly by section
9-302(1) (d), which provides that a financing statement need not be
filed to perfect a purchase money security interest in most con-
sumer goods.137 The rights and liabilities of the maker and the
payee are also covered by Article 3 of the Code on commercial
paper. The consumer-maker is further protected by the warranties
provisions of Article 2 on sales. 38 There is thus no doubt that the
1934 Act is not the proper basis for a suit by a consumer-maker;
it would be absurd to treat his note as a security.
On the other hand, if it is determined that the proceeds of the
note were used for essentially business purposes, then a second in-
quiry is in order: whether the proceeds were used to finance the
purchase of particular business goods or services as opposed to us-
ing the funds for the general financing of the maker's enterprise. 3 9
The use of proceeds to buy specific assets or services is more char-
135. The Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970), defines the
word "consumer" in terms adequate for this purpose:
The adjective "consumer," used with reference to a credit
transaction, characterizes the transaction as one in which
the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a natural
person, and the money, property, or services which are the
subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, fam-
ily, household, or agricultural purposes.
"Consumer goods" are defined in UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-
109 (1) as those "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family,
or house-hold purposes."
136. 352 F. Supp. at 458 (discussing the mutually exclusive coverage of
the 1934 Act and the Truth-in-Lending Act).
137. UN Om CoMnvmRciAL CODE § 9-302(1) (d) :
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all
security interests except the following:
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods; but filing is required for a fixture ... or for a motor
vehicle required to be licensed.
138. See UNIFoRm Co1MvMcrAL CODE §§ 2-312 to -315.
139. This further inquiry is suggested by McClure's discussion of the sep-
arate Truth-in-Lending Act exemptions for commercial and securi-
ties transactions. 352 F. Supp. at 458.
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acteristic of an ordinary commercial note, while the employment
of funds for general financing is more indicative of an investment
note. The inquiry here is clearly into a matter of degree: for
example, the business maker who uses a note to purchase a large
piece of machinery which comprises all or most of the tangible
assets of his enterprise may well be issuing an investment note.
The transaction should be subjected to the remaining criteria sug-
gested. 1 4
0
An excellent example of a case where the use-of-proceeds factor
was an essential element of the context is Joseph v. Norman's
Health Club.141 The plaintiffs' notes were given solely for con-
sumer services represented by a membership in a health club.
The payees were not "investing" in the consumers' notes in any
sense of the word. And while the court never mentioned the con-
sumer nature of the transactions, it is clear that this factor was
lurking somewhere beneath the court's context-over-text approach.
C. RELYING ON THE EFFORTS OF OTHmS: RISK, RIGHTS
REPAYMENT, RECOURSE
The Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,142 speaking of
140. An indicia somewhat related to the use of the proceeds is the busi-
ness organization of the maker. It would be more unusual to char-
acterize the note of an individual proprietor or a partnership as a
security than it would to characterize a corporation's note as an in-
vestment instrument. But this indicator, though perhaps a legitimate
factor, is extremely unreliable, since it is clear that not every cor-
porate note is a security. See SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc.,
289 F. Supp. 3, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Similarly, the organization of a business payee is an unreliable
factor. On the other hand, the character and relative size of the
payee's business might be the subject of a legitimate inquiry. For
example, it would often be difficult to envision a corporation's giving
of a note or notes to an underwriting or investment banking firm
as an ordinary commercial transaction. Beyond that, however, it
would be difficult to classify the transaction as investment or com-
mercial by a mere reference to the fact that the payee is a manufac-
turer, wholesaler, service company, or commercial bank.
The size of the payee's business relative to the size of the maker's
could play an important role in the analysis, though. It has already
been stated that the maker who gives his note in exchange for an
asset which constitutes all or most of the tangible property of his
business might be viewed as selling a security since essentially he is
engaging in the general financing of his enterprise. On the other
hand, if the payee is a large manufacturer which produces and sells
thousands of items such as the one for which the note was given, it
could hardly be said that the manufacturer is "investing" in the
maker's business.
141. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
142. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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"investment contracts" under the 1933 Act, set forth a test in terms
of "whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others."'1 48 Again the Court's test is but a generalized statement of
the issue. The test even has logical inconsistencies since in part it
defines an "investment contract" as involving an "investment of
money," which is but to include that which is being defined in its
own definition. Furthermore, the test could never be taken to its
logical extreme, since it is quite proper to say that even in the
clearest of consumer credit transactions, the person extending
credit expects his profits, in the form of interest, to come solely
from the efforts of the consumer to earn enough money to pay for
the interest (and principal). The same is true for the commercial
creditor: he, too, expects his profits to come solely from the earn-
ings of his business debtor. Besides, a person who purchases stock
of a close corporation of which he is the general manager is surely
"investing" despite the fact that he is largely relying on his own
efforts to produce the profits of the enterprise.
Nevertheless, the test is still conceptually useful in any situa-
tion when it is necessary to determine whether a particular in-
strument is a security. Its use derives from two sources. First, the
court was defining an "investment contract," a phrase which could
serve as a general description of any of the specific instruments in-
cluded in the federal definitions of "security." Second, the test
serves to focus the inquiry on several characteristics incident to
the concept of relying on the efforts of others. These characteris-
tics in the context of notes are organized in terms of the risks in-
curred by the payee, the rights given to the payee, and the con-
templated methods of repayment and recourse.
1. Risk
Professor Coffey of Case Western Reserve University, in seeking
to define a "security" with reference to economic realities, stated,
"It is a major contention of this [author] that risk to initial in-
vestment, though not determinative, is the single most important
characteristic which distinguishes a security from the universe of
other transactions."'144 Again the word "investment" crops up in
an explanation of a definition of that which is an investment, for
143. Id. at 301.
144. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. Rav. 367, 375 (1967). Professor
Coffey's definition of a "security" is found id. at 377 (emphasis
added):
A "security" is:(1) A transaction in which
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it has been seen that the word "investment" is merely an aphorism
for the term "security" as used in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.1 45 A
more substantial difficulty with the position that risk is the single
most important factor is that risk is essentially a function of the
financial standing of the obligor, rather than necessarily being a
function of the transaction itself. Many instruments which are
clearly securities are virtually riskless while other transactions
which just as clearly do not involve securities are fraught with a
high degree of risk. For example, debentures offered publicly by
an old, well-established, "blue-chip" corporation hardly should be
characterized as securities by virtue of the risk involved in their
purchase: such risk is probably non-existent, but the debentures
would be securities nonetheless. On the other hand, a note given
by a young, financially-unstable corporation merely in exchange
for an automobile, for example, possibly could involve a great
amount of risk. Yet under the criteria suggested in this article,
as well as in the views of almost any reasonable businessman or
lawyer, such a note should not be deemed to be a security. Nev-
ertheless, while risk to the initial outlay should not be viewed as
the "single most important" factor, an inquiry into the risk aspects
of a transaction allegedly involving securities is not inappropriate
since risk is to some extent related to the degree to which one
relies on the efforts of others.
(2) a person ("buyer") furnishes value ("initial val-
ue") to another ("seller") and(3) a portion of initial value is subjected to the risks
of an enterprise, it being sufficient if-(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprie-
tary interest in, or debt-holder claim against,
the enterprise, or(b) any property received by the buyer is com-
mitted to use by the enterprise, even though
the buyer retains specific ownership of such
property, or(c) part of initial value is furnished for property
whose present value is determined by taking
into account the anticipated but unrealized
success of the enterprise, even though the
buyer has no legal relationship with the en-
terprise; and(4) at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not
familiar with the operations of the enterprise or
does not receive the right to participate in the man-
agement of the enterprise; and(5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the
seller's promises or representations which give rise
to a reasonable understanding that a valuable bene-fit of some kind, over and above initial value, will
accrue to the buyer as a result of the operation of
the enterprise.
145. See supra Part IIB2.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
Referring specifically to the "debt-holder" portion of his defi-
nition of a "security,"' 4 Professor Coffey explained:
Here the buyer relinquishes specific ownership of his initial
investment and takes in return a creditor's intangible claim against
the enterprise. The initial investment merges into the general
enterprise capital, just as it does in the proprietary interest arrange-
ment. Unlike the buyer of a percentage share, however, the pur-
chaser does not agree to bear the losses of the enterprise pro
rata, and his value is usually to be returned according to a sched-
ule, whether or not the enterprise has suffered losses.
In some cases, there is sufficient junior percentage-share-type
investment to absorb losses before they erode the enterprise assets
to a point where the creditor's original investment is jeopardized.
Holders of debt may not always be so fortunate, however, since
not all enterprises are financially structured to include percentage-
share junior investment, and those which are may provide only
a thin cushion for creditors.
In short, the original value furnished in a debt transaction may
be somewhat more protected from the ravages of enterprise failure
than is the value furnished for a proprietary interest. A secured
debt is merely farther removed from the front lines of risk, for
failure of the enterprise is as likely to take its toll of the prop-
erty securing the debt as it is the rest of the assets.
It seems safe to say, then, that there is a significant degree of
risk to initial value furnished in exchange for debt obligations.147
It is submitted that by including in his definition of a "security"
all "debt-holder claims"'148 which fit the description set forth in
this passage, Professor Coffey takes in too many fish. Whenever
a person extends credit to another, be it in a consumer, commercial
or investment sense, he becomes a debt-holder subject to the risks
of losing his initial value. The ultimate risk is bankruptcy of the
debtor.
In fact, the generalities of Coffey's entire discussion of risk are
of little help where the court must draw the often-fine line be-
tween commercial and investment transactions. Indeed, the profes-
sor recognizes this problem in a later discussion of "the isolated
and private transaction."'149 But his response is disappointing.
He first notes that such transactions usually to some degree possess
all of the necessary economic attributes of a security. He observes:
As the statutes are presently written, the isolated nature of a trans-
action and the element of privateness are generally relevant only
to the issue of whether a transaction should be exempt from reg-
istration... If a transaction is isolated and private, the danger
146. See supra note 144.
147. 18 W. REs. L. RPv. at 385-86 (footnotes omitted).
148. See supra note 144.
149. 18 W. lEs. L. REv. at 407-11.
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of fraud is reduced both quantitatively and qualitatively; in other
words, these elements are factors which mitigate, but do not
eliminate, the probability of fraud.lSo
With special reference to promissory notes and the exclusion of
short-term notes from the 1934 Act definition of a "security,"1 5
1
the professor invokes expressio unius est exclusio alterius reason-
ing to conclude "that factors in mitigation of the probability of
fraud are relevant to the issue of exemption [from registration]-
not to the issue of security status.' 52 He summarizes with the be-
lief that there is little justification in the statutes for excluding a
transaction from "security" classification merely because of its pri-
vate and isolated character. 53
But he is still troubled by the isolated and private purchase-
money note situation. He recognizes the argument that some notes
just were not intended to be covered by the fraud provisions and
states that "the policy of the argument would probably be one of
judicial and administrative economy."' 4  With all deference, it
would seem that the policy of the argument rests with the the-
oretical impossibility of treating all notes as securities. Totally ig-
noring the context-over-text language of the statute, Professor Cof-
fey concludes that the only way out of the predicament is by
amendment to the statute. 155
Despite the theoretical and practical difficulties of Coffey's anal-
ysis, this writer believes that risk factors are indeed a legitimate
subject of inquiry in the determination of whether a particular note
is a security. Again the question is one of degree, though. The
following three sub-factors seek to aid in measuring that degree.
2. Rights Given to the Payee
One measure of the degree of risk involved in a note transac-
tion derives from the beliefs of the parties. The maker, recogniz-
ing the risk to a large outlay by the payee, may confer upon the
payee certain rights usually incidental to an investment interest.
Such rights may include the right to vote and/or inspect the books
and records of a corporate maker 56 The corporate maker may
150. Id. at 408.
151. See supra note 5.
152. 18 W. RES. L. REv. at 408.
153. Id. at 409.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 411.
156. Cf. CAr,. CoRP. CODE § 306 (West 1955). In Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 337 (1967), it was noted that the instruments under con-
sideration gave voting rights to their holders. The instruments, it
will be recalled, were held to be securities.
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also be prevented from paying dividends, changing the capital or
operational structure of the company, or engaging in acquisitions
or spin-offs until the notes are paid. Other rights of control over
the operations and affairs of the maker may be given to the payee.
If such rights are given to the payee, then this may be a strong,
though probably not controlling, indication that the notes were
treated as securities by the parties themselves.
On the other hand, the taking of such rights by the payee
merely might reflect a disparity in bargaining position between it
and the maker, and an exercise of such superior power by the
payee indeed may be totally unrelated to the risk attendant to the
transaction. And even if the reason for the payee's assertion of
its greater bargaining position is somehow related to risk, then
still that relationship may be disproportionate to the degree of risk
involved. For example, even a financially stable maker may be
forced to grant such rights to a more powerful payee if the payee
has any fear that the maker's success will lead it into acquisitions
or changes in its capital or operational structure which could sub-
ject the payee's initial outlay to some greater degree of risk. In
fact, if the payee is powerful enough, it may require that such
rights be given to it in all transactions, whoever the maker is and
regardless of whether or not its fears are justified. As the vari-
ables increase, the focus of the inquiry shifts away from whether
the transaction involves securities, and at some point it may be
necessary to conclude that the factor of rights given to the payee
is not at all relevant.
3. Methods of Repayment
The manner in which the notes are to be paid may also aid in
the determination of whether or not the notes are securities. If
the notes are payable in full on a definite date, or are payable in
fixed installments, then the indication is that the payee is no more
than a general creditor, although this aspect of the factor may not
be particularly reliable. On the other hand, a strong indicia that
the notes are securities would be a scheme whereby repayment is
contingent on the maker's profits or is payable only out of the
maker's production.1 57 Thus, again, the terms of the transaction
fixed by the parties themselves may be factors of the risk in-
volved; such terms are properly put in the balance when deter-
mining whether the notes are securities.
157. Cf. Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960) ($50,000
promissory note payable solely out of maker's production).
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4. Methods of Recourse
The nature of the collateral security for the notes, if any, may
also be a factor. If the security is limited to the asset purchased
by the maker, then the inference is that the notes were not used
to generally finance the maker's enterprise. In contrast, if the col-
lateral extends beyond that which was purchased, a more propri-
etary-type interest may be indicated. And if the notes are totally
unsecured, then contrary conclusions may be drawn: the lack of
collateral security may reflect an equity type of interest, or it may
reflect instead a general creditor's interest. The size of the trans-
action'5" may aid in determining which polar extreme is indicated
because if the payee is supplying a substantial portion of the mak-
er's funds or assets, then perhaps more of an equity type of interest
is reflected. On the other hand, the chosen method of recourse
merely may reflect a disparity in bargaining power, as with the
factor of the rights given to the payee.
In summary, from the Supreme Court's general "relying on the
efforts of others" test there may be derived the relevant factors of
risk, rights given to the payee, and methods of repayment and re-
course. The reliability of these factors will vary greatly with the
facts of each case. The inquiries suggested here vividly illustrate
the difficulty of the analysis, the varying degrees of relevance of
the factors involved, and the need to examine all the facts of the
transaction as an integrated whole.
D. THE NuxBms GAMEs
Although it is extremely difficult to draw lines by reference to
the number of notes issued, the number of payees to whom they
were issued, and the dollar amount of the transaction, these too
are legitimate factors. They are also extremely. interrelated fac-
tors. That the number of notes issued is relevant is indicated by
two sources. The first is the previously-discussed case of SEC v.
Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.159 The court, in holding that cer-
tain loans and notes were not securities, distinguished "the 'per-
sonal loan' cases relied upon by plaintiff" on the basis that those
cases involved "a whole series of notes, not one or two."'01 0 Second,
in similar language the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of
an investment security states that "a 'security' is an instrument
which ... is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divis-
158. See infra Part IVD.
159. 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
160. Id. at 38.
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ible into a class or series of instruments."' 61 The conclusion is
that where a series of notes is involved, they probably are securi-
ties; where only a few are involved, they may not be.
The number-of-notes factor is closely related to an even more
well-recognized indicia: the number of payees involved. If there
is merely one isolated note payable to one person, then the indica-
tion is that it is probably not a security. This would be the case
where all negotiations take place between two persons only, or
perhaps among three, if a bank is used to provide the cash for a
purchase of a commodity by one of the persons from the other.
On the other hand, where many notes are given by the maker to
many persons, then it is more probable that securities, and pos-
sibly a public offering of them, are involved. It is thus not sur-
prising to recall that most of the important cases holding notes to
be securities involved a public offering of sorts.162
161. UNIFoR ConmciAL CODE § 8-102. The entire definition of a se-
curity in the Code is as follows:
§ 8-102. Definitions and Index of Definitions(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires(a) A "security" is an instrument which
i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securi-
ties exchanges or markets or commonly rec-
ognized in any area in which it is issued or
dealt in as a medium for investment; and(iii) is either one of a class or series or by its
terms is divisible into a class or series of
instruments; and(iv) evidences a share, participation or other in-
terest in property or in an enterprise or evi-
dences an obligation of the issuer.
Note especially the introductory "context-over-text" language. The
Official Comment to Code § 8-101 is careful to note that Article 8
"is neither a Blue Sky Law nor a corporation code. It may be
likened rather to a negotiable instruments law dealing with securi-
ties." Furthermore, the Official Comment to § 8-102 itself recognizes
that obviously there may be securities which fall under the federal
definition but which do not fall within the Code definition. Never-
theless, it is clear that if an instrument is a security under the
Code, it is also a security under the 1934 Act. The Code definition
is also useful as an indication of "what character the instrument is
given in commerce." SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S.
202, 211 (1967), quoting SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
352-53 (1943).
The majority and dissenting opinions in the Seventh Circuit's
decision in the Tcherepnin case both noted the relation between the
Code, the 1934 Act and the instruments in question. Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion discus-
sion at 383), rev'd, 389 U.S. 332.
162. E.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972);
Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953); SEC v. Addison,
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Another related, though perhaps more unreliable, factor is the
dollar amount of the transactions involved. In its very brief af-
firmance of the district court's opinion in Movielab, the Second
Circuit announced the principle:
In this court, appellants strenuously urge that claims of fraud
in connection with the issuance of notes in every private loan
transaction cannot be within the scope of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Otherwise, they say, federal jurisdiction could be
invoked in connection with the issuance of any check or note no
matter how small the transaction so long as some instrumentality
of interstate commerce was used. We need not deal with that
hypothetical situation. Appellants concede that the definition of
security in section 3(a)(10) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10),
states that "The term 'security' means any note . . ." and there-
fore includes some notes at the very least. Clearly then, notes
issued by one publicly owned company to another publicly owned
company for $10,500,000, payable over a period of 20 years, in
exchange for the assets of the latter easily fall within the pur-
view of the Act, which we have only recently been directed to
construe "flexibly, not technically and restrictively."' 16 3
This passage indicates that the appellate court in Movielab to some
extent was concerned with the nature and substance of the trans-
action, rather than merely with a literal reading of the statutory
definition of "security."' 6 4 If Movielab is viewed in fact as involv-
194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961); SEC v. Vanco, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 943
(D.N.J. 1958).
163. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1971),
aff'g 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added). The Second
Circuit's decision is the first federal appellate opinion in a case
where the maker of a note sued the payee on the theory that the
payee had fraudulently purchased securities.
164. The Second Circuit recently suggested the correctness of this con-
clusion in Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., [1973 Current] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 93,903 (2d Cir. March 22, 1973). Zeller was a deriva-
tive suit on behalf of a subsidiary against its parent for allegedly
forcing the subsidiary to loan $315,310 to the parent at inadequate
interest rates. The loans at first were in the form of open-account
advances, but were later evidenced by an 8% demand note. The
claim for relief was based on both the 1933 and 1934 Acts on the the-
ory that the subsidiary was a defrauded purchaser of a security,
namely the note. The parent had paid the amount of the advances
together with interest, but the suing stockholder claimed consequen-
tial damages on behalf of the subsidiary. The district court dis-
missed the action on the theory that the 1934 Act, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1970), which limits a plaintiff's recovery to "actual dam-
ages," does not permit the recovery of consequential damages. As a
preliminary matter, the court of appeals rejected the parent's claim
that no security was involved; the court held that the demand note
was a security. During the course of its discussion on this point,
the Second Circuit stated:
It does not follow, however, that every transaction with-
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ing a major asset acquisition, then such a transaction often is ef-
fectuated by issuing securities, and it is not unlikely that the notes
in Movielab properly were treated as securities.
Still, it is not altogether clear how significant a role the dollar
amount of the transaction should play. For example, the amount
of the note in McClure was 200,000 dollars; in Fifth Avenue the
notes and loans ranged from 85,000 dollars to 1,800,000 dollars.
But the amount of the notes in neither of these cases led to a hold-
ing that they were securities. Is the line to be drawn somewhere
between 10,500,000 dollars (Movielab) and 1,800,000 dollars (Fifth
Avenue)? Or is it just that McClure and Fifth Avenue recognized
what the court in Movielab did not: that large corporations deal
in great sums of money, and that fact of itself does not make those
dealings transactions in securities, even where notes are involved.
This writer believes that the second alternative is the better one,
and would prefer that the dollar amount of the notes be recog-
nized, if at all, as a somewhat unreliable factor.
The "numbers game" leads to three conclusions: first, the num-
ber of notes issued is relevant; second, the number of payees in-
volved and the extent of the offering is very significant; and
third, the dollar amount of the transaction may be treated as a
factor, but only as a rather unreliable one.
E. Th.vm ELEm=Ts
A factor similar to the "numbers game" is the time element fac-
tor. This factor presents a two-step approach. First, are the notes
in the introductory clause of § 10, which involves promis-
sory notes, whether of less or more than nine months ma-
turity, is within Rule lOb-5. The Act is for the protection of
investors, and its provisions must be read accordingly.
See Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d
Cir. 1971).
CCH Frm. SEC. L. REP. f 93,903 at 93,621 (emphasis added). The ap-
pellate court, without further analysis, proceeded to find that the
subsidiary "stood in the position of an investor, although perhaps an
involuntary one, with respect to" the parent, id., a conclusion of
doubtful validity in view of the criteria suggested in this article.
The Zeller case is significant because the court, while correctly
recognizing the purpose of the statute, begged the question by assert-
ing its conclusion without saying why the subsidiary should have
been treated as an investor and thus as a purchaser of a security.
The Second Circuit's decision reaffirms not only its willingness to
accept the principles underlying the Act as indicated in Movielab,
but also the great need to analyze the question in terms of some
standards or criteria, rather than merely stating a bald conclusion.
The court went on to hold that consequential damages are recover-
able. See infra note 172.
522 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 52, NO. 4 (1973)
payable at a fixed time or on demand by the payee?1 6 5 - If they
are fixed-time notes, then they may or may not be securities. But
it is highly unlikely that notes payable on the demand of the payee
or holder would be securities: when a "demand" provision is em-
bodied in a security, it is generally a demand on the part of the
issuer, not the holder, as with securities subject to call or redemp-
tion provisions at the option of the issuer.166
165. A related inquiry would be whether the notes are payable to order
or bearer. Securities under the Uniform Commercial Code must, ac-
cording to § 8-102(1) (a) (i), be "issued in bearer or registered form."
See supra note 161. But obviously order notes can be securities un-
der the 1934 Act.
Similarly, whether or not the notes are transferrable or negotiable
may be relevant under the Code, but not under the Exchange Act,
except to the extent that non-transferrable or non-negotiable notes
may indicate closer person-to-person dealings between the parties.
Such situations would obviate the need to sue on the instruments
themselves; suit could be maintained on the underlying obligation,
such as a contract to purchase an asset.
166. An analogous problem arises in the tax area when a taxpayer trans-
fers appreciated property to a corporation in return for corporate
notes. Here the taxpayer, if he is a controlling shareholder, will try
to assert that the notes are securities so as to escape taxation on the
appreciation under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 351. Section 351 pro-
vides essentially that no gain or loss shall be recognized when prop-
erty is transferred to a corporation in exchange for its stock or se-
curities if the transferor controls the corporation after the transfer.
Thus the courts in another context must determine whether certain
notes are securities. It is clear that demand notes are not. See
Turner v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1964) ("notice of in-
debtedness" against which payee could withdraw funds "at any
time" not a security.).
The Second Circuit in the Zeller case, see supra note 164, held that
the demand note there involved was a security. At first blush this
holding is directly contrary to the position taken in the text and by
the Turner case in the tax area that demand notes probably are not
securities. However, the Zeller court's primary discussion was ad-
dressed to the question of whether demand notes fall within the
exception to the statutory definition of securities for notes having
maturities of less than nine months. See supra note 5. Expressly
leaving the question open, the court concluded that the particular
note involved could not qualify for the exception even if some de-
mand paper could so qualify. Since the question was thus whether
the note fell within the general definition of securities, rather than
within the narrow exception to that definition, the court, citing
Movielab, recognized that the mere fact that notes were involved
did not necessarily bring the case within Rule lOb-5. CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. ff 93,903 at 93,621; see supra note 164. This recognition neces-
sarily implies that not all notes should be treated as securities. The
court without further discussion then held that the note involved
should be treated as a security. Thus, the court did not discuss the
demand nature of the note except with respect to the question of
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If the note is payable on a fixed date or at fixed intervals,
then the further inquiry should be as to the length of time be-
tween issuance and maturity. This factor is, of course, another
matter of degree. But it would not be unusual for the courts to
attempt to draw such time lines with respect to notes.16 7 Notes
with relatively long maturities-for example, thirty or forty years
-might truly reflect a proprietary interest.
It is not clear how much emphasis was placed by the Second
Circuit on the twenty-year term of the notes in Movielab. The
term was mentioned in the passage quoted above,168 and this may
serve as a further indication that the appellate court was analyzing
the case in terms of substance over form and that the result in the
case may have been appropriate.
F. CHARACTERZATION OF THE NoTES ON THE RELEvANT
FIxANcIAL STATEmENTS
The last factor suggested inquires into how the parties charac-
terize the notes on their financial statements. A characterization
whether demand notes fall within the short-term commercial paper
exception to the definition of securities-no mention was made of the
demand nature of the note as affecting the question of whether the
instrument fell within the general definition of securities. Further-
more, the court itself indicated that perhaps the note involved should
not even have been viewed as a demand note since "the maker of the
note [the parent] could prevent any demand by the holder [the
subsidiary] and the note was outstanding for ten months." Id. at
93,620.
167. Again in the § 351 area of tax law, it has been observed that "the
length of time to maturity usually is regarded as the most important
single earmark. Notes with a five-year term or less rarely seem
able to qualify as 'securities,' while a term of ten years or more
ordinarily is sufficient." B. Brxmm & J. EusTicE, FEDERL INcobm
TAXATrON OF CoRoRATioNs AND S aHAnoLuERs 3.04 (3d ed. 1971)
(note especially cases cited in footnote 17).
While perhaps more certainty is needed in the tax law than in
the federal securities law area, it seems that such mechanical tests
should not control. This has been held to be true by the Tax Court
itself. Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 737,
750-51 (1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
826 (1956). Nevertheless, the time factor remains a legitimate area
of inquiry under both the tax law and the 1934 Act.
It is submitted, however, that a ten-year rule of thumb in the
securities area would be highly inappropriate: the financing of an
expensive machine which comprises but a small portion of a large
corporate maker's assets may well involve a note with an over-ten-
year maturity. Such a purchase money note probably should not be
treated as a security under the 1934 Act.
168. 452 F.2d at 663.
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indicating that the parties believed that the notes were securities
should be given some weight. For example, the court in Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 169 holding that the short-term notes in-
volved were securities, observed that the issuer characterized the
notes, which were offered to the public, as "short term open mar-
ket paper" in its financial statements,1'70 thus indicating that the
issuer recognized the investment nature of the notes.
In summary, when courts are faced with the determination of
whether particular notes are securities, they must embark upon a
substance-over-form approach. The factors suggested here are in-
tended to aid in that determination by helping to identify just what
the context of the transaction is: commercial or investment.
V. CONCLUSION
The maker of an ordinary commercial note, as opposed to an
investment note, should not be able to sue the payee in federal
courts under the 1934 Act. The five cases which have squarely pre-
sented the issue are split. Three of them followed a plain mean-
ing-literal language approach and allowed the maker to sue, dis-
regarding the context-over-text language of the 1934 Act itself, the
legislative history of the federal securities laws, and the import of
the relevant case law. The other two followed a substance-over-
form approach and refused to allow the maker to sue in the federal
courts. It is submitted that the latter two cases were correct and
that the reasoning of the former three was erroneous. Further-
more, the results in at least two of the three cases answering af-
firmatively the questions posed in this article were incorrect.
The ramifications of allowing the maker to state a claim under
the 1934 Act are sweeping: not only procedural rights, but indeed
substantive rights as well, are significantly altered by allowing
the suit. When faced with such a problem, the courts must ex-
amine the facts with the principle of context-over-text firmly in
mind. Several factors are suggested to aid in the court's determi-
nation.
Throughout this article it has been suggested that the district
court's reasoning in the Movielab case was highly erroneous be-
cause it would allow the maker of an ordinary commercial note
to sue its payee in the federal courts, but that the result of the
case was perhaps correct because the notes involved may have been
investment notes.171 It is appropriate, therefore, to attempt to
169. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
170. Id. at 1079 (emphasis added).
171. See supra Parts IIA, IIC, IVD-E.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
analyze Movielab in terms of the criteria suggested in this article.
On the one hand, the two notes over which the dispute arose to-
talled 10,500,000 dollars, a great sum of money, and had twenty-
year maturities, a relatively long term. Furthermore, the pro-
ceeds were used for a major asset acquisition, and in the common
expectations of the business world, notes used for such a purpose
might well be characterized as securities since securities often in
fact are given in such acquisitions. These factors would indicate
that the notes were properly treated as securities. On the other
hand, there was not a whole series or class of notes involved, nor
was there a public offering; only two long term and one short
term notes were given to a single payee, and apparently the nego-
tiations were limited to the two parties. Also, there are not enough
facts given in the opinions to determine the extent to which the
payee was relying on the efforts of the maker: the risk, rights,
repayment and recourse factors cannot be ascertained. Finally, it
is not known how the notes were characterized by the parties
themselves on the financial statements. These factors might indi-
cate that the notes were ordinary commercial notes that should
not have been treated as securities. In conclusion, the notes in
Movielab probably fell somewhere in the gray area between notes
which are clearly of an investment nature and notes which are
clearly of an ordinary commercial character.
When faced with such a "gray area" case, how is the court to
resolve the issue? It is submitted that if, after applying the sug-
gested criteria, it is still unclear as to how the notes should be
characterized, then the courts should, and probably will, resolve
the question by looking at the degree of alleged fraud involved and
the amount of protection which is needed by the plaintiff. These
factors do not, strictly speaking, indicate whether the instruments
are securities. But if in an equitable sense it appears that a high
degree of fraud was involved, or that the plaintiff is in great need
of protection, then it is not inappropriate in a "gray area" case to ex-
tend to the injured party the advantages of being able to bring his
claim in a federal forum under the 1934 Act. After all, "we are
against fraud aren't we?"172
172. Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAw. 793, 922 (1967) (Milton V. Freeman relating what Summer Pike
said at the SEC meeting where Rule lOb-5 was first approved). In
the Zeller case, see supra note 164, the Second Circuit held that the
1934 Act, § 28 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (a) (1970), which limits a plaintiff's
recovery to "actual damages," does not preclude an award of conse-
quential damages, provided the claimant establishes "the causal nex-
us with a good deal of certainty." CCH FtD. SEc. L. REP. f 93,903 at
93, 623. However, the court also stated, 'We would see nothing wrong
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But the "gray area" cases aside, the split in the courts calls for
authoritative resolution of the problem. The only federal appel-
late decision on the subject is rather nebulous. But the resolution
does not rest with Congress. That body has done all it can by re-
quiring that context govern text. It cannot be expected to antici-
pate all of the various factual situations which may arise. Rather
the resolution rests with the federal courts. And they should not
attempt to fulfill their duty by resort to a literal language ap-
proach.
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in a principle varying the required degree of certainty somewhat in-
versely with the depth of the fraud." Id. at 93,623 n.11. To be sure,
the court was not discussing whether it would be more disposed to
find that the instrument involved was a security in a "gray area"
case where the degree of fraud was high; the court had already held
that the note was a security. Nevertheless, the court's statement
clearly indicated a disposition to grant more readily the protections
of the federal securities laws where the degree of fraud is great. It
would not be illogical to expect a similar disposition to appear where
the question is whether a particular note is a security, the suggested
criteria do not give a definitive answer, and the amount of fraud
involved is great.
